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Abstract. In Twitter based applications such as tweet summarization,
the existence of ill-intentioned users so-called spammers imposes chal-
lenges to maintain high performance level in those applications. Conven-
tional social spammer/spam detection methods require significant and
unavoidable processing time, extending to months for treating large col-
lections of tweets. Moreover, these methods are completely dependent on
supervised learning approach to produce classification models, raising the
need for ground truth data-set. In this paper, we design an unsupervised
language model based method that performs collaboration with other
social networks to detect spam tweets in large-scale topics (e.g. hashtags).
We experiment our method on filtering more than 6 million tweets posted
in 100 trending topics where Facebook social network is accounted in the
collaboration. Experiments demonstrate highly competitive efficiency in
regards to processing time and classification performance, compared to
conventional spam tweet detection methods.
Keywords: Social spam · Social networks · Collaboration · Topics
1 Introduction
With the enormous popularity of online social networks (OSNs) over the Inter-
net, ill-intentioned users so-called spammers have exploited OSNs for spreading 
spam content (e.g. advertisements, porn materials, and phishing websites) [1]. 
Indeed, performing spamming tasks by spammers may cause major problems in 
different directions, such as: (i) polluting search results by spam information; (ii) 
degrading statistics accuracy obtained by mining tools; (iii) consuming storage 
resources; (iv) and violating user’s privacy. However, with these serious problems, 
OSNs’ anti-spam mechanisms have failed to end-up the spam problem, raising 
real concerns about the quality of “crawled” data collections. Hence, besides the 
importance of OSNs data for tremendous range of areas such as search engines 
and research field, filtering out noisy data to have high quality information is
c
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the obvious and straight forward solution. Information quality process in social
networks is generically summarized in three dependent steps [2]: (i) selecting
the data collections (e.g. Facebook accounts, Tweets, Facebook posts) that need
improvements; (ii) determining the noise type (e.g. spam, rumor) to be filtered
out; (ii) at last, applying pre-designed algorithms depending on the chosen noise
type to produce noise free data collections.
In the battle of fighting spam on Twitter, a considerable set of methods
[1,3–8] has been designed for detecting spam accounts and spam campaigns
with little attention dedicated toward spam tweets detection. The account-level
and campaign-level detection methods are time consuming, requiring months to
process large collections consisting of millions of Twitter users. The main source
of high time consumption is the use of constrained REST APIs1 to retrieve a
required information (e.g. followers, followees, and user time-line) to perform
such detection methods. On the other side, the existing tweet-level spam detec-
tion methods are grounded on exploiting the features extraction concept com-
bined with supervised machine learning algorithms to build a predictive model
using an annotated data-set. The main strength point of tweet-level is the fast
detection in regards to time consumption since the detection process is performed
on the available information in tweet object only. However, given the fact that
spammers are too dynamic in the spam contents, tweet-level detection methods
have drawbacks and limitations, including the followings aspects: (i) the use of
non-discriminative and ineffective features such as number of words in tweet;
(ii) the need for an annotated data-set to build a classification model; (iii) and
the use of supervised learning algorithms produces biased models toward the
training set adopted.
In this paper, we introduce a design of an unsupervised method for filter-
ing out spam tweets existing in large-scale collections of trending topics. Our
method performs collaboration with other OSNs through searching and gath-
ering information relevant to trending topics. Then, a content matching is per-
formed between a desired tweet and retrieved information, like Facebook relevant
posts, to decide later the class label of the considered tweet. In this work, we
hypothesis that the volume and the content of spam on OSNs vary depending
upon the privacy rules followed by OSNs. For instance, Facebook2 social net-
work adopts restricted rules more than Twitter in opening new accounts such
as mobile verification, which impose difficulties to create huge spam campaigns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
about Twitter-based spam detection methods. Section 3 presents the notations,
problem formalization, and design of our collaborative method used in detecting
spam tweets. Section 4 describes the data-set used in validating our approach.
Section 5 presents the experimental results. Section 6 concludes the paper with
providing future perspectives.
1 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public.
2 https://www.facebook.com/policies.
2 Related Work
Most of the existing works for fighting spam on Twitter have focused on account
and campaign (bot) detection levels with little efforts spent for spam tweet-level
detection.
Tweet-Level. At this level, individual tweets are checked for the existence of
spam content. Benevenuto [1] extracted a set of simple statistical features from
the tweet object such as number of words, number of hashtags, and number
of characters. Then, a binary classifier is built on a small annotated data-set.
Martinez-Romo and Araujo [9] detected spam tweets in trending topics through
employing language models to extract more features such as the probability
distribution divergence between a given tweet and other tweets of a trending
topic. The major problem at this level of detection is derived from the lack of
sufficient information that can be extracted from tweet object itself. In addition,
building language models using tweets of trending topics definitely fails when
having huge spam attacks. Our work overcomes these shortcomings through
exploiting topic relevant information from other OSNs.
Account-Level. Methods designed in [1,3,5,10,11] work firstly through build-
ing features vector by extracting hand-designed features such as number of fol-
lowers, and node betweenness. Then, supervised machine learning algorithms are
applied to build a classification model on an annotated data-set. Despite of high
detection rate when exploiting such features, extracting them requires significant
time to collect information from Twitter’s servers through using REST APIs.
Indeed, these APIs are constrained to a certain and predefined number of calls,
making the extraction of most features not possible in regards to time point of
view, especially when treating large-scale data-set.
Campaign-Level. Chu et al. [8] proposed a spam campaign detection method
through clustering accounts according to available URLs in tweets. Then, they
represented each cluster by a vector of features similar to account-level detec-
tion methods. In [12], a classification model was designed to capture differences
among bot, human, and cyborg. Regrettably, this level of detection has similar
account-level methods drawbacks, making such solutions not scalable for large
collections of users or tweets.
3 Collaborative Model Design
Our approach focuses on finding a matched information on other OSNs for a
given tweet related to a certain topic. As the obvious purpose of using topic
modeling in OSNs is to group similar information, the probability of finding
same information talking about same topic on different OSNs is relativity high.
Conversely, the probability of finding same spam content posted under the same
topic is relativity low because of its dependency on spammers’ goals and the
openness of OSNs themselves. Therefore, instead of extracting uninformative
features (e.g. number of words in tweet) to learn model using machine learning
algorithms, we rely on using statistical language model concept to detect spam
tweets.
3.1 Notations and Definitions
Let CH = {T1, T2, ...} be a collection of tweets for a particular trending
topic H, where T• element represents the tweet object modeled as 2-tuple
T• = <Text,Actions>. Also, we model the information retrieved about the
topic, H, from defined social networks (e.g. Facebook, Instagram), SN•, as a
finite set SH = {SNFacbook, SNInstagram, ...}. Each SN• is modeled as a finite
set of posts SN• = {O1, O2, ...} where the element O• is defined by 2-tuple
O• = <Text,Actions>. Each element inside the post O and tweet T tuple is
defined as follows:
Text. As each post may consist of text, we represent the content of post as a
finite set of textual words, Text = {w1, w2, ...}.
Actions. Users of social networks may perform actions on posts as a reaction
toward the content of posts or tweets. We define actions as a finite set of 2-tuple,
Actions = {<aname1 , aval1>,<aname2 , aval2>, ....}, where aname represents the
name of action (e.g. like, share, and comment on Facebook) depending upon
the considered social network, and aval ∈ N≥0 is the number of times that the
corresponding action performed by social network users on the considered post
or tweet.
3.2 Problem Formalization
Given a collection of tweets CH associated with a trending topic, H, and posted
by a set of distinct users UH such that UH ≤ |CH |, our main problem is to
filter out spam tweets in the given collection CH without involving information
requiring REST API calls. More formally, we aim at designing a function f such
that it predicts the class label of each tweet in the desired collection, defined as
f(T ) : T → {spam, non-spam}, T ∈ CH .
3.3 Tweet Likelihood, Post Prior, and Tweet Classification
Tweet Likelihood. We leverage statistical language models [13] to estimate the
relevance degree of other OSNs’ posts with a given tweet to make a decision later
about the tweet. Language modeling method computes the probability P (D|Q)
of a document D being generated by a query Q to rank a set of documents. We
transform the same concept to get out the most relevant post in other social
networks for a given tweet. Thus, we treat tweets as queries and posts as doc-
uments, with computing the post O probability of being generated by a tweet
T as:
PSNi(O|T )
rank
= PSNi(O).PSNi(T |O) = PSNi(O).
∏
w∈T.Text
PSNi(w|O) (1)
PSNi(O) is the post prior probability such that O ∈ SNi. The post prior can
be viewed as tweet-independent features (i.e. features not extracted from tweet
object) representing the probability of being non-spam content in the social
network SNi. Estimating the other probability component P
SNi(T |O) can be
performed using different models (Jelineck Mercer, Dirichlet) [13] to compute
PSNi(w|O) or (Kullback-Leibler divergence) [14] to calculate the degree of dis-
similarity between the tweet and post language models. In this paper, we use
the uni-gram language model for representing tweets and posts because of its
outstanding performance in information retrieval field. Also, we adopt Kullback-
Leibler divergence (KL) method because of its fast computation time compared
to others. However, the classical version of KL method cannot be exploited
directly in computing the PSNi(T |O) probability since the zero value of KL
means that the language models of tweet and post are completely similar. More-
over, the range of KL method is unbounded, meaning that the∞ value appears
when two language models are dissimilar. Hence, we customize the current ver-
sion of KL method to inverse the semantic of KL values (i.e. 0 =⇒ dissimilar
and 1 =⇒ similar) with bounding its values, where the probability component
PSNi(T |O) is defined as:
P
SNi (T |O) =
log |T.Text| −
∑
w∈T.T ext P (w|MT ) ∗min(| log
P (w|MT )
P (w|MO)
|, log |T.Text|)
log |T.Text|
(2)
where P (w|MT ) and P (w|MO) are the probability of word w being generated
by tweet and post language models (MT ,MO), respectively.
Post Prior. As the retrieved posts of social network, SNi, may consist of spam
content, we estimate the probability of being non-spam through leveraging the
actions performed by users on the retrieved posts set (i.e. more actions =⇒ low
probability for being spam post). We assume that actions (e.g. like, comment,
and share) are independent features, and thus the general formula for calculating
post prior is computed as:
PSNi(O) =
∏
A∈O.Actions
P (A) (3)
where P (A) is estimated using the maximum-likelihood of performing the action
A on the post O, computed as P (A) = Count(A,O)
Count(A,SNi)
. Count(A,O) = A.val
means that the number of times that the action A performed on the post O.
Count(A,SNi) represents the summation of action A over available posts in SNi.
Tweet Classification. When doing inference for a given tweet over a set of
posts in SNi, we obtain a vector of probability values where each represents the
degree of matching between a post and a given tweet. We exploit these values
to make a decision about the class label of a given tweet. To do so, we define a
thresholded decision function that labels tweets as non-spam in case of finding at
least one post on any social network having probability above a fixed threshold.
Table 1. Statistics of Twitter and Facebook crawled data-sets.
Twitter Facebook
Property Value Property Value
# of accounts 2,088,131 (4.9% spammers) # of users 3,122
# of tweets 6,470,809 (11.8% spam) # of posts 6,880
# of replied tweets 76,393 # of comments 2,398,611
# of re-tweeted tweets 3,129,237 # of reactions 64,083,457
Formally, we define the crisp decision function as follows:
F (T, SH) =
{
non-spam max{ P
SNi (O|T )
Sum(SNi,T )
|SNi ∈ SH , O ∈ SNi} ≥ ∆
spam otherwise
(4)
where the function Sum(SNi, T ) =
∑
O∈SNi
PSNi(O|T ) normalizes the proba-
bility of each post retrieved from a certain social network SNi, making their sum-
mation equals to one. ∆ is a threshold interpreted as the minimum probability
(i.e. matching degree) required to classify the considered tweet T as non-spam.
4 Data-Set Description and Ground Truth
As various social networks available over web, in this paper, we experiment our
method through performing collaboration with Facebook social network only.
Hence, in this section, we describe the Twitter and Facebook data-sets that
have been exploited in validating our method.
Twitter Data-Set. The data-sets used at tweet level detection [1,9] are not
publicly available for research use. Also, Twitter’s polices allow to publish only
the IDs of accounts and tweets of Twitter data-sets. Indeed, in context of social
spam problem, using ID is not a solution since Twitter might already have
deleted the corresponding object (account or tweet) and thus no information is
available to retrieve. Hence, we developed a crawler to collect tweets using real-
time streaming method provided by Twitter. Then, we launched our crawler for
five months, from 1/Jan/2016 to 31/May/2016, with storing the topics that were
trending in the specified period. Afterward, we clustered the crawled tweets based
on the available topics in the text of tweets, with discarding the tweets that don’t
have a trending topic. As thousands of topics available in our tweets collection,
we selected the tweets of 100 trending topics randomly sampled to validate our
approach. To build an annotated data-set consisting of spam and non-spam
tweets, we leverage a widely followed annotation process in the social spam
detection researches, named as “Twitter Suspended Spammers (TSS)” [9]. The
process checks whether the user of each tweet was suspended by Twitter. In case
of suspension, the user is considered as a spammer as well as the corresponding
tweet is labeled as a spam; otherwise we assign non-spam and legitimate user for
tweet and user, respectively. We performed this process in 1/Nov/2016 to gain
large set of spam tweets, annotated around 763,555 as spam tweets and about
102,318 as spammers (spam accounts), as reported in Table 1.
Facebook Data-Set. For the selected 100 trending topics, we crawled the corre-
sponding Facebook posts that contain those topics and posted during the period
1/Jan/2016 to 31/May/2016. It is important to mention that Facebook com-
munity has stopped recently post searching APIs in the latest version, v2.8, of
Graph API3 released on August 2016. Thus, we overcome this obstacle through
developing a Facebook crawler that searches for a particular topic using a normal
Facebook account and then parses the HTML tags of the retrieved posts. We
automate this process through using open source Selenium web browser automa-
tion tool4. In total, as reported in Table 1, we crawled more than 6,880 Facebook
posts generated by about 3,122 different users in less than one hour.
5 Results and Evaluations
5.1 Experimental Setup
Performance Metrics. As the ground truth class label about each tweet is
available, we exploit accuracy, precision, recall, F-measure, average precision,
average recall, and average F-measure, computed according to the confusion
matrix of Weka tool [15], as commonly used metrics in classification problems.
As our problem is two-class (binary) classification, we compute the precision,
recall, and F-measure for the “spam” class, while the average metrics combines
both classes based on the fraction of each class (e.g. 11.8% * “spam precision” +
88.2% * “non-spam precision”).
Baselines. We define two baselines to compare our method with: (i) baseline
“A” which represents the results when classifying all tweets as non-spam directly
without doing any kind of classification; (ii) baseline “B” which reflects the
results obtained when applying supervised machine learning algorithms on state
of the art “tweet” features described in Table 2. As many learning algorithms
provided byWeka tool, we exploit Naive Bayes, Random Forest, J48, and support
vector machine (SVM) as well-known supervised learning methods to evaluate
the performance of the mentioned state of the art features.
Parameter Setting. In computing the post prior probability, PSNi(O), we
adopt “Likes”, “Shares”, “Comments”, “Wow”, “Love”, “Sad”,“Haha”, and
“Angry” as actions. In our method, ∆ is the main variable in classifying tweets
and thus we study the impact of changing its value through performing experi-
ments at different values of ∆ ∈ [0.1, 1.0] with 0.1 increment step. For the Naive
Bayes method, we set the “useKernelEstimator” and “useSupervisedDiscretiza-
tion” options to false value as default values set by Weka. For Random Forest, we
set the option max depth to 0 (unlimited), with studying the effect of changing
3 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/using-graph-api.
4 http://docs.seleniumhq.org/.
number of trees ∈ {100, 500}. For J48 method, we set the minimum number of
instances per leaf to 2, number of folds to 3, and confidence factor to 0.2. For
the SVM method, we use the LibSVM [17] implementation integrated with Weka
tool with setting the kernel function to Radial Basis and examining the impact
of gamma ∈ {0.5, 1}, where the rest parameters are set to the default ones.
Experiment Procedure. For the baseline “B” experiments, we use the concept
of cross validation along the 100 trending topics in our data-set, summarized in
the following steps: (i) for each topic, we build a feature vector space using the
state of the art features described in Table 2; (ii) then, a feature vector space of
a selected topic (training set) only is used to build a predictive model using a
chosen learning algorithm; (iii) the feature vector spaces of rest topics (i.e. 99
topics for testing) are validated on the built classification model in the previous
step; (iv) the validation results in terms of true positive, true negative, false
positive, false negative are extracted and stored; (v) the steps from ii to iv are
repeated on each topic in the collection; (vi) at last, using the validation results
obtained for each single topic, we calculate the performance metrics mentioned
above. It is important to mention that the experiment procedure for the baseline
“B” simulates exactly the real scenarios in detecting spam tweets.
In experimenting our method, for each topic we perform the following steps:
(i) for a certain value of classification threshold ∆, the designed classification
model in Sect. 3 is applied on the considered topic tweets using the correspond-
Table 2. Description of the state of the art “tweet” features used in building supervised
classification models [1,9,16].
Feature name Description
Number of hashtags Counts the number of hashtags available in the tweet
text
Number of spam words Counts the number of words that listed as spam words
in the tweet text
Hashtags ratio Ratio of number of hashtags with respect to the
number of words in the tweet
URLs ratio Ratio of number of URLs posted in the tweet with
respect to the number of tweet words
Number of words Counts the number of words in the tweet
Number of numeric
characters
Counts the number of numeric characters in the tweet
text
Number of URLs Counts the number of URLs posted in the tweet
Number of mentions Counts the number of accounts (users) mentions in the
tweet
Replied tweet Checks whether the tweet is a replied tweet or not
Tweet and URL content
similarity
Measures the similarity between the tweet text and
the text of URL posted in Tweet
ing topic Facebook posts to predict the class label of tweets; (ii) then, the results
in terms of true positive, true negative, false positive, false negative are extracted
and stored for final results computations; (iii) the previous two steps are per-
formed on each topic in the data-set; (iv) in the last step, the results of whole
topics are summed together to compute the performance results using the men-
tioned metrics.
5.2 Experimental Results
According to the results of the baselines reported in Table 3, the supervised clas-
sification models have strong failure in filtering out the spam tweets existing in
the 100 trending topics. This failure can be easily captured from the low spam
recall values (4th column) where the highest value is obtained by NaiveBayes
learning algorithm. The 10.5% of spam recall obtained by NaiveBayes means
that less than 80,000 of spam tweets can be detected from around 736,500 spam
tweets. The low spam precision values also give an indication that a signifi-
cant number of “non-spam” tweets has been classified into “spam” ones. Sub-
sequently, as spam F-measure is dependent on recall and precision metrics, the
values of spam F-measure are definitely low. The accuracy values of baseline “B”
are close to the accuracy value of baseline “A”. However, given the low values of
spam precision and spam recall, the accuracy metric in this case is not an indica-
tive and useful metric to judge on the supervised learning as winner approach.
More precisely, the supervised learning approach does not add significant contri-
bution in increasing the quality of the 100 trending topics tweets. The key idea of
using different machine learning algorithms with playing in their parameters is
Table 3. Performance results of baseline A and baseline B in terms of different
metrics.
Learning
algorithm
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure Avg.
precision
Avg.
recall
Avg. F-
measure
Baseline (A): All tweets labeled as non-spam
————— 88.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0.% 88.2% 88.2% 88.2%
Baseline (B): Supervised machine learning approach
Naive Bayes 81.2% 13.7% 10.5% 11.9% 79.0% 81.2% 80.1%
Random Forest
(#Trees = 100)
86.4% 13.2% 2.8% 4.6% 79.0% 86.4% 80.1%
Random Forest
(#Trees = 500)
86.5% 12.6% 2.6% 4.7% 79.4% 86.5% 82.8%
J48 (Confidence
Factor = 0.2 )
86.4% 13.8% 2.9% 4.9% 79.6% 86.4% 82.5%
SVM (Gamma
= 0.5)
87.2% 15.7% 0.2% 0.4% 78.3% 87.2% 82.5%
SVM (Gamma
= 1.0)
87.0% 15.9% 0.1% 0.3% 77.9% 87.0% 82.2%
Table 4. Our collaborative method performance results in terms of different metrics,
showing the impact of post prior probability component when performing collaboration
with Facebook social network.
Model
(∆)
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure Avg.
precision
Avg.
recall
Avg. F-
measure
Uniform post prior probability
∆ = 0.1 49.8% 10.8% 48.3% 17.7% 79.7% 49.8% 61.3%
∆ = 0.2 32.3% 10.8% 69.4% 18.7% 79.1% 32.3% 45.9%
∆ = 0.3 26.2% 10.8% 77.0% 18.9% 78.6% 26.2% 39.3%
∆ = 0.4 22.8% 10.9% 82.3% 19.2% 78.5% 22.8% 35.3%
∆ = 0.5 21.0% 11.0% 85.3% 19.4% 78.7% 21.0% 33.2%
∆ = 0.6 19.4% 11.0% 87.9% 19.6% 78.8% 19.4% 31.2%
∆ = 0.7 18.7% 11.1% 89.3% 19.7% 79.1% 18.7% 30.3%
∆ = 0.8 17.5% 11.1% 90.9% 19.8% 79.3% 17.5% 28.7%
∆ = 0.9 17.2% 11.1% 91.5% 19.8% 79.2% 17.2% 28.3%
∆ = 1.0 17.2% 11.1% 91.6% 19.8% 79.4% 17.2% 28.3%
Non-Uniform post prior probability
∆ = 0.1 80.7% 17.0% 18.8% 17.8% 81.4% 80.7% 81.0%
∆ = 0.2 80.6% 17.2% 19.3% 18.2% 81.5% 80.6% 81.0%
∆ = 0.3 79.3% 15.8% 19.6% 17.5% 81.2% 79.3% 80.2%
∆ = 0.4 77.8% 15.0% 21.1% 17.5% 81.1% 77.8% 79.4%
∆ = 0.5 73.4% 13.5% 24.9% 17.4% 80.8% 73.4% 77.1%
∆ = 0.6 64.0% 12.3% 36.4% 18.5% 80.7% 64.0% 71.4%
∆ = 0.7 57.7% 11.9% 43.4% 18.7% 80.6% 57.7% 67.2%
∆ = 0.8 51.9% 11.5% 49.0% 18.6% 80.3% 51.9% 63.0%
∆ = 0.9 42.2% 11.0% 59.0% 18.6% 79.8% 42.2% 55.2%
∆ = 1.0 34.79% 10.7% 66.0% 18.5% 79.1% 34.79% 48.3%
to highlight the badness of the state of the art tweet features. Overall, the results
obtained by the learning models draw various conclusions: (i) the state of the art
features are not discriminative among non-spam and spam tweets, ensuring the
dynamicity of spam content; (ii) spammers tend to publish tweets almost similar
to non-spam ones; (iii) adopting a supervised approach to perform training on
an annotated data-set of trending topics and applying the classification model
on future or not annotated trending topics is not the solution at all.
Taking a look at our method performance results in Table 4, the behavior
is completely different in recalling (classifying) “spam” tweets, especially when
the value of ∆ gets higher. The recall results are completely consistent with the
Eq. 4 designed for classifying tweets. For high values of ∆, the major difficulty is
in finding at one high matched Facebook post to classify the considered tweet as
“non-spam”. Thus, this explains the dramatic degradation in the accuracy when
increasing the value of ∆. Although of high recall values, the spam precision
values of our method are almost similar to the supervised learning approach ones.
Uniform vs. Non-uniform Post Prior. The role of post prior probability
component is obvious in detecting spam tweets. Working on the assumption that
each Facebook post has same probability (uniform) for being non-spam increases
the spam recall values when the value of ∆ gets higher, leading to detect most
spam tweets. On contrary, a significant number of “non-spam” tweets has been
predicted as “spam” ones. We interpret this behavior because of the small value
of post prior probability when working on the uniform probability assumption.
Indeed, this problem is reduced when considering the actions performed on Face-
book post to compute the post prior probability component. Thus, the spam
recall has increased without high degradation in the accuracy values. Although
of low values of spam precision, the high values of average precision mean that
little tweets have been classified as “non-spam” where they are truly “spam”.
High Quality vs. False Positive. In email spam filtering, the efforts are
directed for the false positive problem that occurs when a truly “non-spam”
email is classified as “spam”. However, in the context of social spam, the false
positive problem is less important because of the availability of large-scale data
collections, meaning that classifying “non-spam” tweet as “spam” is not a seri-
ous problem to worry about. Thus, the attention is turned in social networks
context to increase the quality of data where a wide range of Twitter based
applications (e.g. tweet summarization) has high priority to work on noise free
collections. Also, the computational time aspect is significant when targeting
large-scale collections. Hence, our method is completely suitable to process large-
scale collections with providing high quality collections. For instance, the time
required to process our Twitter data-set is no more than few hours, distributed
between crawling data from Facebook and applying our model. At last, as var-
ious experiments are given for different ∆ values where no optimal value can
satisfy all performance metrics, the selection is mainly dependent on the desired
requirements of the final collection. For instance, high ∆ value is recommended
to have too high quality collection with having high probability to lose not noisy
information.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we study the impact of performing collaboration with social net-
works to filter out spam tweets in large-scale collections of trending topics. We
propose an unsupervised method grounding on the language model concept to
find out similar information in other social networks considered in the collabora-
tion. Our method outperforms conventional detection spam methods in regards
to time consumption, requiring few hours to process around 6 millions tweets
posted in 100 trending topics. With this novel idea in battle of fighting spam,
we plan as a future work to study the effect of performing collaboration with
additional social networks such as Instagram. Also, we intend to improve the
classification performance through extracting more features from users’ com-
ments such as sentiment features. Moreover, we plan to study the behavior of
using different language models with their estimations.
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